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I. Introduction 
This paper involves a test of the competitive equilibrium as a model of the interdependence that 
exists between input and output markets. The test was motivated by the questions of skeptical 
students who were just learning the details of the competitive model. It was also motivated as a 
natural extension of existing results. In essence, the interdependence between input and output 
markets has been observed in several laboratory studies in which arbitrage could occur in markets 
separated by space or by time [6, 599-624; 5; 8, 1063-1071; 3, 223-241; 1, 537-567; 2, 955- 
981; 7, 106-127; 9, 1-33]. Goods acquired by an arbitrager or by a speculator can be viewed as 
inputs taken from one market and then when sold by the same agent in a spatially separated or a 
temporarily separated market, they can be viewed as outputs resulting from a simple production 
process. Thus, all experiments in which such market activity exists can be viewed as having in- 
volved production. However, in all cases studied to date the market interdependence was rather 
transparent and the production technology was linear. In this study, the problem posed for the 
multiple markets is not transparent and the technology is nonlinear. 
The exposition is developed so that the complexity of the model and the situation can be 
appreciated by readers who have not attempted to work through the details of the competitive 
model. The competitive model involves an extraordinary number of definitions and behavioral 
hypotheses, any of which might be unrealistic. All of them are part of the resulting model and 
predictions but they are frequently buried in axioms and exist implicitly in notation and defi- 
nitions. The strategy of this paper is to solve the model showing at each step the definition or 
behavioral hypothesis that is applied so that all of the theoretical machinery is covered. The pur- 
pose is to provide data that show that interdependent markets can grapple with a complex problem 
essentially in the way that the theory suggests. The paper provides no substantial conclusions 
about the fine aspects of theory. Whether or not markets can always do it or how markets do it 
is not addressed. Section I describes the experimental setting. Section II develops the model and 
section III contains the data. 
*The financial support of The National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Table I. Marginal Redemption Value Table for Each of Six Buyers of x 
Redemption Value 
(in cents) Unit 
1 98 
2 88 
3 78 
4 70 
5 60 
6 50 
7 43 
8 33 
9 25 
10 15 
11 10 
12 (and more) 0 
Table II. Marginal Cost Schedule for Six Sellers of y (in Cents) 
Seller Number 
Unit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 10 35 50 65 80 100 
2 150 165 180 205 130 115 
3 275 310 255 295 235 220 
4 400 400 400 400 400 400 
5 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
II. The Experimental Setting 
The experimental setting involved two markets. One market is for output, called x, and the other 
market is for input, called y. The output market consisted of six buyers. Each buyer had the same 
induced value function shown on Table I. The input market contained six sellers with the induced 
cost function in Table II. In addition, there were four producers each of which had the production 
technology for producing x that is contained in Table III. The parameters in the tables are in 
terms of dollars. Subjects were presented the redemption values and costs in terms of an artificial 
medium called francs. All trading took place in francs which could be converted to dollars at 
rates of 1 cent, 3 cents, and 4 cents per franc for buyers, sellers, and producers, respectively. 
A total of four experiments were conducted. Subjects were students of a principles of eco- 
nomics class at the California Institute of Technology. Many of these subjects had participated in 
computerized multiple double-auction markets prior to these experiments. Experiment 4 involved 
mostly subjects with no prior experience at all. Instructions were read and a practice period was 
used to familiarize subjects with the trading technology. 
Two markets were open simultaneously for a period of 10 minutes for the first few periods 
and then the time was reduced to 6 minutes. Producers were able to purchase y and add it to 
their y inventories. Once in inventory, y could be transformed into x, according to Table III, by 
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Table III. The Production Function xi = 7yi - (y2/2) 
Input Marginal Output 
0 0 
1 7 
2 5 
3 5 
4 3 
5 3 
6 1 
7 1 
8 (and above) 0 
hitting a function key. The "produced" x appeared in the x-market inventory from which it could 
be sold. 
The computerized multiple unit double-auction program [4] permits bids and asks for mul- 
tiple units in both the x and y markets. Trades occur in real time. Production necessarily occurred 
in advance of sales and inventories could not be carried forward to the next period. Once pro- 
duced, x was perishable. 
III. The Model 
The model is a straightforward application of modem theory. The market demand for the output 
x is computed. Market supply of x is computed as a function of the price of the input y. This cal- 
culation involves a definition of a cost function, application of the profit maximization hypothesis 
and application of the definition of market supply as a sum of individual supplies. An application 
of the law of supply and demand allows the price of x to be calculated as a function of the price 
of y. Derived demand theory yields the individual demands for y. Application of the definition of 
market demand and market supply allows these functions to be calculated as a sum of individual 
functions. The law of supply and demand can then be used to calculate the price of y and the 
price of y can be used to calculate all other magnitudes. In the analysis below each step in the 
application of the theory will be made explicit. 
The first problem is to define a market demand function. The competitive model requires 
that only one price exists in a market. For the output market x, this price is denoted as P and 
for the input market y it is denoted as the lower case p. The competitive model requires that 
buyers and sellers are price takers and utility maximizers. From these definitions and maintained 
hypotheses the values in Table I can be used to create individual demand functions. The definition 
of market demand as a sum can be used to get the market demand function shown in Figure 1. A 
continuous approximation of the market demand is drawn as a dotted line. The equation for this 
approximation is: 
Xd = 68(1 - .01P) (1) 
when P = the price of x. 
By application of a similar set of postulates, the values in Table II can be used to get indi- 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Demands, Supplies and Equilibria 
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vidual supply functions for y. When these are aggregated, a market supply is obtained. The actual 
supply function is shown in Figure 1. A continuous approximation of market supply is given by 
the function 
Ys = (8/140)p (2) 
where p is the price of y. 
This approximation is shown as a dotted line in the figure. 
There are four agents with the ability to produce x from inputs of y. Each has a production 
function 
Xi = 7yi - (yi/2) (3) 
where (xi, yi) is the output and input level of agent i. 
To find the equilibrium price of x at any given price of y, as expressed in (14) below, requires 
that one obtain the individual supply functions from the four producers given by (10) below, sum 
them to get market supply given by (11), and then use the law of supply and demand at (12). The 
theory and derivations are as follows. 
From the profit maximization hypothesis and the law of one price in a competitive market 
the producers' decisions become: 
maxPxi - C(xi). (4) 
Xi 
From (4) we get the behavioral equation (first order conditions) 
P - C'(xi) = 0. (5) 
The definition of C(xi) is 
C(xi) = pYi (6) 
so using the competitive hypothesis that price is a constant one gets 
C'(xi) = p(dyi/dxi). (7) 
Since there is only one input, the binomial formula can be applied to (3) to get Yi = 
7 - (72 - 2xi)1/2. So we have 
(dyi/dxi) = (72 - 2xi)-1/2 (8) 
Substituting (8) into (7) and the results into (5) we obtain for each i 
P =p(49 - 2xi)1/2. (9) 
Solve for xi to get the individual firm supply function for x 
Xi = [49 - (p/P)2]/2. 
973 
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Use (10) and the definition of market supply as the sum of individual supply functions to get 
x, = 4xi = 4{[49 - (p/P)2]/2} = 98 - 2(p/P)2. (11) 
In order to find the equilibrium P apply the law of supply and demand to the x market 
Xd = xs. (12) 
Substitute from (1) and (11) and the law becomes 
68(1 - .01P) = 98 - 2(p/P)2. (13) 
Simplify to 
(p2/p2)_ .34P = 15. (14) 
The solution to this yields the equilibrium P expressed as a function of p. 
To find the equilibrium price of y, i.e., p, one must find the demand for y and then apply 
the law of supply and demand to find the equilibrium price. 
To find market demand for y, the individual demand functions must be derived. From the 
profit maximization hypothesis one has 
max Pxi - pyi. (15) 
Yi 
Substitution from (3) yields 
maxP[7yi - (y2/2] - pyi. (16) 
Yi 
From the first order conditions and competitive market assumptions (prices are constants), we get 
P(xi/dayi)-p = 0. (17) 
From differentiation of (3) we get 
P(7 -yi) =p. (18) 
Solve for yi to get individual demand function for y 
yi=7 - (p/P). (19) 
The market demand function is the sum of individual demands from the 4 demanders under 
competition 
Yd = 4[7 - (p/P)]. (20) 
In order to find the equilibrium price of y as given in (23) below, apply the law of supply and 
demand 
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Yd = Ys (21) 
Substitute from (20) and (2) to get 
4[7 - (p/P)] = (8/140)p. (22) 
Solve to get the equilibrium price of y 
p = 490P/P + 70. (23) 
In order for both markets to be in equilibrium, the equilibrium prices P and p must satisfy both 
equilibrium equations (14) and (23) simultaneously. Substitute (23) into (14) to obtain 
(1/P2)[(490P)/(P + 70)]2 - .34P = 15 (24) 
which simplifies a little to 
4902/(P + 70)2 - .34P = 15. (24) 
The equation is a third degree polynomial of which one root is the equilibrium price. Solving and 
then solving for quantities from (1) and (2) the equilibrium prices and quantities are 
P = 28.57 x = 48 
p = 142.02 y = 8.12. (25) 
These magnitudes are predicted as the general equilibrium by the competitive model. 
The above model is continuous. The discrete values it approximates are in Figure 1. As can 
be seen, the equilibrium prices are 28 in the x market and 140 in the y market. Ordinarily a 
trading commission of a few cents is necessary to facilitate trades so it would not be unreasonable 
to expect the y market prices to be below these predicted prices by 5 cents (2 francs) or so and 
the x market to be above these prices by a similar magnitude. 
IV. Results 
Four experiments were conducted. The time series of prices and contracts are in Figures 2-5. For 
example, in Experiment 1 and period 1 of the x market shown in Figure 2, the first unit sold 
at a price of approximately 97 francs and the second unit sold for about 95 francs. The thirty- 
three dots on the graph represent thirty-three units traded that period. As can be seen, prices fall 
throughout the period with the last trade at about 50. The data are imposed over the dotted lines 
which are the competitive prices predicted by the competitive model. 
The average prices, volumes and efficiencies are in Table IV. For the last period average 
prices (P,p) are (27.7, 129), (23.4, 135.2), (35.1, 144), (33.1, 155.7) for experiments 1, 2, 3, 
and 4, respectively. These compare favorably to the equilibrium values (28, 142). The volumes 
(x, y) are (43, 7), (54, 9), (56, 9), and (43, 7) in the three experiments and these compare favor- 
ably to the equilibrium values of (48, 8). As can be seen, the data are close to the model in the 
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Table IV. Average Prices, Volume and Efficiency 
x Market y Market 
Production Production 
Experiment Period Average Price Volume* Average Price Volume* System Efficiency 
1 1 70.9 30 123.1 6 .77 
2 45.6 48 133.8 8 .96 
3 30.9 43 129.3 8 .91 
4 27.7 43 129.0 7 .98 
2 1 58.3 48 114.2 8 .96 
2 40.0 47 127.4 8 .99 
3 34.6 41 127.7 7 .93 
4 30.3 48 134.7 8 1.00 
5 26.8 43 135.1 7 .83 
6 23.4 53 135.2 9 .97 
3 1 50.1 44 167.3 8 .91 
2 40.1 49 150.1 9 .88 
3 36.1 47 148.8 8 .97 
4 37.2 48 144.0 8 .98 
5 35.1 49 144.0 9 .95 
4 1 44.7 56 102.9 15 .09 
2 35.5 48 148.4 9 .89 
3 35.9 48 153.8 8 .98 
4 32.0 53 154.9 9 .93 
5 32.6 48 159.3 8 1.00 
6 33.1 43 155.7 7 .98 
Competitive 
Equilibrium 28 48 142 8 100 
*Market volume can differ from these numbers because of trading between producers. 
sense that one would expect a very different distribution from simply random behavior of prices 
and volume. Furthermore, if one accepts the double exponential model as a representation of the 
data, prices are converging to the equilibrium.' 
1. We introduce the double exponential adjustment model as a tool to explore the visual impression that prices are 
converging to the competitive equilibrium. While the model is ad hoc in the sense that it has no theoretical justification, 
it is nevertheless a tool that permits us to make objective statements about the patterns in the data. 
The model for any given market is 
iPtc -P*, = aept+YC 
where 
t = period number 
c = contract (transaction) number in the period 
P* = competitive equilibrium price. 
To the extent that this model is a representation of the data, prices are converging to the competitive equilibrium 
between periods if / < 0 and within periods if y < 0. The parameter a measures the distance from equilibrium at the be- 
ginning of the experiment in francs. If a = 0 then the markets opened at equilibrium and neither f or y need be different 
from zero. 
As shown in Table V, the , 's and y's tend to be negative and significant. The exceptions are the coefficient for c 
in market 2 of experiments 1 and 2. In both of these markets y is positive. Notice, however, that in both of these markets 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 17:47:26 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
INPUT AND OUTPUT PRICES IN AN EXPERIMENTAL MARKET 
Efficiency refers to the actual consumers' plus producers' surplus taken as a percentage of 
the maximum possible. Operationally, efficiency is the total of redemption values received by 
the final holders of x minus the total of costs paid by the initial suppliers of y. The difference 
between the two totals is a measure of consumer plus producer surplus generated by the market. 
The efficiency measure is the difference between the totals taken as a percentage of the maxi- 
mum possible difference. The maximum possible in attained efficiency is 100 percent (which is 
predicted by the competitive model). 
The efficiency numbers in Table IV do not reveal the usual monotonic properties of market 
efficiency time series. Usually efficiency starts low and slowly climbs as experience leads to fewer 
wasted units and the competitive equilibrium is approached. By contrast, efficiency in three of 
the four markets starts high and stays high. These high figures tell us that the deviations from the 
competitive equilibrium do not involve large losses of gains from exchange. In evaluating the suc- 
cess of the markets in coordinating exchanges, it is important to realize that without production 
and trade the efficiency levels would be zero. These markets, starting from a floor of nothing, 
almost completely exhausted such gains from exchange that were possible. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
These data focus attention on interesting methodological problems that have surfaced in the pro- 
fession from time to time regarding the best way to "test" models. Should a model be judged by 
the validity of its assumptions or simply the accuracy of its predictions? What degree of accuracy 
should be applied? Which predictions are to be tested? The data provide a good example of the 
use of the "as if" methodology and the nature of the controversy it can generate. 
On one hand, a casual look at the data is sufficient to show that many of the assumptions 
of the competitive equilibrium model are false when the model is applied to these markets. In 
particular: 
(a) The law of one price in a competitive market does not hold in these markets. There- 
fore the variables P and p in the competitive model are without unique operational 
definitions. 
(b) Individuals do not take prices as constants. The variance in prices reflects attempts to 
force a "better deal by agents." 
(c) People do not optimize. "Unused" inventories that appear from time to time reflect 
losses that could have been avoided by selling the units. 
(d) The markets do not attain an immediate equilibrium if indeed they ever "equilibrate" in 
the sense of no changes. 
(e) If P and p are measured as average prices, then the price predictions are wrong (by a 
few cents). 
initial prices are near the equilibrium as measured by ae +7 (9 francs and 15 francs, respectively) so no pronounced 
convergence process is detected in the intraperiod measures even though movement is noticeable in the interperiod 
measure. 
While this model is useful as a measure of price movements a word of caution is necessary. The Durbin-Watson 
tests are included in the table as a warning that the model involves substantial autocorrelation. While AR1 corrections and 
weighted least squares (for heteroscedasticity) can be applied to get t-statistics down and R2 up, such statistical massaging 
seems to simply mask a more fundamental problem of specification. 
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Table V. Coefficients (t-Statistics*), Number of Observations, R2 and Durbin-Watson Test for the Model 
ln Ptc -Pe = a + ,3t +yc 
Experiment# Market# a /3 y n R2 DW 
1 1 5.244 -.951 -.036 167 .723 .537 
(25.314) (-18.358) (-8.420) 
2 2.189 -.111 .104 31 .150 1.079 
(3.021) (-1.007) (1.902) 
2 1 3.648 -.378 -.208 276 .494 .478 
(20.007) (-14.210) (-8.144) 
2 2.810 -.180 .048 48 .184 1.193 
(6.427) (-2.546) (2.380) 
3 1 3.588 -.203 -.029 245 .548 1.214 
(28.982) (-9.278) (-14.017) 
2 4.072 -.398 -.138 40 .519 1.977 
(9.829) (-5.344) (-3.135) 
4 1 3.632 -.389 -.014 281 .382 .575 
(17.273) (-12.901) (-3.750) 
2 3.934 -.179 -.119 54 .160 1.319 
(6.979) (2.217) (-2.868) 
*The t-statistic for a is for significant difference from 1 while the other two are for significant difference from 0. 
Thus, scholars who are uncomfortable with the application of a model to cases in which the as- 
sumptions are not true can find substantial reasons for not applying the competitive model. A 
methodology that requires a literal interpretation and application of theory would force one to 
conclude that the competitive model can be rejected as having incorporated incorrect assumptions 
and having made predictions that are false. 
On the other hand, it is the case that aspects of the markets behave substantially "as if" the 
competitive assumptions were satisfied. A methodology that prevents an application of the model 
as a means of organizing the data would force one to ignore much of what the data can teach 
us about behavior. Application of the "as if" philosophy has benefits. Relative to the model, the 
following generalizations are consistent with observations. 
(a) A convergence process is occurring in both markets. With stationary parameters the 
market system is converging in the direction of the competitive equilibrium. 
(b) After a few periods the data are "close" to the competitive equilibrium in the sense that 
no other model (based on initial parameters) does better.2 
(c) Even though the assumptions of the competitive model are false they appear to capture 
the essence of extremely complex phenomena. No other assumptions drawn from any 
other academic discipline have the dual claim of tractability and reasonable accuracy of 
a resulting model. 
In spite of its mathematical complexity, the competitive model is very crude when placed 
in the context of these interactive markets and behaviors. Nevertheless, if the assumptions of the 
2. The Courot model when applied to the continuous approximation of the market parameters produces similar 
outcome predictions. 
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model are applied with an "as if" interpretation, the resulting model is very powerful. Aside from 
the dynamics, prices and outputs behave as if the system is "competitive" in the sense of the 
competitive model. The markets appear to be capable of solving not only the problem as posed by 
competitive theory but also even harder problems. These markets converged to near the equilib- 
rium within an hour after instructions were read to the participants. In essence, the mathematical 
problem was solved quickly and without all the relevant information existing in a single place. 
The participants knew only their own parameters and none of the theory. Some sort of parallel 
processing appears to be taking place but its form remains a mystery. 
References 
1. Forsythe, Robert, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Charles R. Plott, "Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market." 
Econometrica, May 1982, 537-67. 
2. , "Futures Markets and Information Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination." Journal of Finance, Septem- 
ber 1984, 955-81. 
3. Hoffman, Elizabeth and Charles R. Plott, "The Effect of Intertemporal Speculation on the Outcomes in Seller 
Posted Offer Auction Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1981, 223-41. 
4. Johnson, Alonzo, Hsing-Yang Lee, and Charles R. Plott. "Multiple Unit Double Auction User's Manual." Social 
Science Working Paper No. 676. Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, June 1988. 
5. Lynch, Michael, Ross M. Miller, Charles R. Plott, and Russell Porter. "Product Quality, Informational Effi- 
ciency, and Regulations in Experimental Markets." Social Science Working Paper No. 518. Pasadena: California Institute 
of Technology, January 1984. 
6. Miller, Ross M., Charles R. Plott, and Vernon L. Smith, "Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical 
Study of Speculation." Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1977, 599-624. 
7. Plott, Charles R., "Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets." Economic Journal, March 
1983, 106-27. 
8. and Jonathan T. Uhl, "Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study." Southern Eco- 
nomic Journal, April 1981, 1063-71. 
9. Williams, Arlington W. and Vernon L. Smith, "Cyclical Double-Auction Markets with and without Speculators." 
Journal of Business, January 1984, 1-33. 
983 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 17:47:26 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
